Suchergebnisse

Part one. Espionage: Exploiting home-field advantage -- Defeating encryption -- Building a backdoor -- Strategic espionage -- Counterintelligence -- Part two. Attack: Strategic sabotage -- Targeted disruption -- Coercion -- Testing and demonstration -- Part three. Destabilization: Election interference -- Exposure -- Theft, ransom, and manipulation -- Widespread disruption.

Why do nations break into one another's most important computer networks? There is an obvious answer: to steal valuable information or to attack. But this isn't the full story. This text draws on often-overlooked documents leaked by Edward Snowden, real-world case studies of cyber operations, and policymaker perspectives to show that intruding into other countries' networks has enormous defensive value as well.

Why do nations break into one another's most important computer networks? There is an obvious answer: to steal valuable information or to attack. But this isn't the full story. This book draws on often-overlooked documents leaked by Edward Snowden, real-world case studies of cyber operations, and policymaker perspectives to show that intruding into other countries' networks has enormous defensive value as well. Two nations, neither of which seeks to harm the other but neither of which trusts the other, will often find it prudent to launch intrusions. This general problem, in which a nation's means of securing itself threatens the security of others and risks escalating tension, is a bedrock concept in international relations and is called the 'security dilemma'. This book shows not only that the security dilemma applies to cyber operations, but also that the particular characteristics of the digital domain mean that the effects are deeply pronounced. The cybersecurity dilemma is both a vital concern of modern statecraft and a means of accessibly understanding the essential components of cyber operations.

Cyber vulnerabilities, and their exploits, pass through identifiable stages of life. (Survival / SWP)

Encryption's new normal is changing the way in which states assert their sovereignty at home and abroad. Cryptography has gone mainstream. Now more than ever, encryption is used by ordinary citizens, often without their knowledge, and is a subject of national debate. Intelligence and law-enforcement officials warn of the dangers of messages they cannot read. Presidents and prime ministers weigh in on the way cryptography shapes the balance between liberty and security. The Edward Snowden revelations drive encryption-related coverage in major newspapers, even as the technology is rolled out by increasing numbers of companies over government objections. All told, it may be the most international attention a mathematical concept has received since the space race. These ongoing debates exist at the intersection of at least three fields: law, applied mathematics and international relations. The legal debate varies by country, and centres on what restrictions on cryptography the government may enact under each state's domestic political system. The debate in applied maths, drawing on computer science and software engineering, addresses whether or not it is technically feasible to place limitations on cryptographic implementations, such as those desired by some governments, without sacrificing security or the right to privacy. The international-relations debate, which is only nascent, questions what the widespread use of cryptography means for the future of states in the international system. For all the recent discussion and increasing use of cryptography, however, many of the core concepts of the modern debate are not entirely new. In legal and applied-maths circles, similar debates took place in the 1980s, as powerful new forms of encryption came to the fore. Another round of discussion took place in the 1990s, as the spread of the internet dramatically increased the number of encryption users and raised the prospect that the security and privacy offered by cryptography would spread beyond American borders. Much can be learned from these previous debates that can help to ascertain the implications of cryptography for international relations. In several important respects, the increasing implementation of secure cryptographic systems reshapes the concept of state sovereignty. It is clear that the seemingly irreversible rise of strong encryption will place particular types of communication beyond the state's reach, while at the same time leaving policymakers with alternative means of reasserting state power. In this way, encryption is similar to other potential challenges to sovereignty, such as globalisation. In practice, the widespread use of cryptography alters how states relate to one another, and to their own citizens. It raises important questions about the legitimate use of a state's own power, and the ways in which this power is constrained by the power of other states. (Survival / SWP)

AI is revolutionizing the world. Here's how democracies can come out on top. Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing the modern world. It is ubiquitous—in our homes and offices, in the present and most certainly in the future. Today, we encounter AI as our distant ancestors once encountered fire. If we manage AI well, it will become a force for good, lighting the way to many transformative inventions. If we deploy it thoughtlessly, it will advance beyond our control. If we wield it for destruction, it will fan the flames of a new kind of war, one that holds democracy in the balance. As AI policy experts Ben Buchanan and Andrew Imbrie show in The New Fire, few choices are more urgent—or more fascinating—than how we harness this technology and for what purpose. The new fire has three sparks: data, algorithms, and computing power. These components fuel viral disinformation campaigns, new hacking tools, and military weapons that once seemed like science fiction. To autocrats, AI offers the prospect of centralized control at home and asymmetric advantages in combat. It is easy to assume that democracies, bound by ethical constraints and disjointed in their approach, will be unable to keep up. But such a dystopia is hardly preordained. Combining an incisive understanding of technology with shrewd geopolitical analysis, Buchanan and Imbrie show how AI can work for democracy. With the right approach, technology need not favor tyranny.

Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? - This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution. Matching an offender to an offence is an exercise in minimising uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black-and-white problem; and strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically. Successful attribution requires a range of skills on all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent communication, and recognising limitations and challenges. Adapted from the source document.